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This paper exploits data on the pattern of violence across regions
and over time to estimate the impact of the peace process in Northern
Ireland on house prices. We begin with a linear model that estimates
the average treatment e⁄ect of a con￿ ict-related killing on house prices
￿showing a negative correlation between house prices and killings. We
then develop an approach based on an economic model where the para-
meters of the statistical process are estimated for a Markov switching
model where con￿ ict and peace are treated as a latent state. From
this, we are able to construct a measure of the discounted number of
killings which is updated in the light of actual killings. This model
naturally suggests a heterogeneous e⁄ect of killings across space and
time which we use to generate estimates of the peace dividend. The
economic model suggests a somewhat di⁄erent pattern of estimates
to the linear model. We also show that there is some evidence of
spillover e⁄ects of violence in adjacent regions.
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11 Introduction
Con￿ ict in Ireland has a long history. Even after the Republic of Ireland was
created as an independent state in 1920, the status of the mainly Protestant
north remained contested. From the late 1960￿ s a violent con￿ ict ￿ ared
up which claimed around 3500 lives. Only more than two decades later,
from 1993 onwards, emerged a peace process which, while initially fragile,
culminated in a cessation of violence and a return to devolved government
by 2007. The con￿ ict was a major source of social and economic dislocation.
But, as peace took hold, this has begun to be repaired.
The extensive literature on con￿ ict in economics emphasizes the economic
costs of ￿ghting ￿both in discouraging investment and in out-migration from
areas of intense con￿ ict. Even during the height of the con￿ ict in Northern
Ireland, violence was not uniform. For example, Belfast ￿the capital city
of the province of Northern Ireland ￿was particularly hard hit. Looking
for economic consequences of the peace process, we would therefore expect
bene￿ts to be concentrated among areas where violence was most prevalent.
To this end, this paper studies one economic aspect of the peace process and
the dividend that it brought to residents of Northern Ireland ￿the impact on
house prices. Houses are assets whose prices re￿ ect the present and future
expected attractiveness of living in an area. We therefore expect the current
level of violence to have a direct e⁄ect on prices in so far as it contains relevant
information about the future. This paper exploits within-region variability in
violence and house prices over time. Having such variation is rare in studies
of the economic consequences of con￿ ict.
Our speci￿c measure of violence here is con￿ ict related deaths. These
have the advantage of being well-documented in this particular instance by
Sutton (1994) and the Con￿ ict Archive on the Internet (CAIN). Importantly,
we are able to match the location of the death to a region within Northern
Ireland. We then look for a peace dividend in the form of increased house
prices in response to a reduction in killing. For this we use a quarterly house
price index for 11 regions of Northern Ireland for 1984q1 to 2008q4.
One aspect of the paper is to pursue an interpretation of the ￿ndings
through the lens of an economic model of house prices. We argue that
the interpretation of a correlation between con￿ ict and housing prices hinges
on a theory of the violence generating process. To that end we assume
that killings are informative about an unobserved state ￿peace or con￿ ict
￿and that during the period following the beginning of the peace process,
2citizens were using information about killings to update their views about
the likelihood of being in that state. We then estimate the parameters of the
Markov process generating transition probabilities across states. Our theory
can be used to construct an estimate of the expected present discounted
value of deaths in each region as a function of the history. This creates a
￿treatment e⁄ect￿of a killing in a particular region in a given quarter which is
naturally heterogeneous ￿depending on the overall pattern of killing in that
region. This model is shown to explain house price changes and predicts
a pattern of changes in house prices across regions that is rather di⁄erent
from ￿tting OLS. In particular, it suggests in line with intuition that there
are bigger peace dividends in regions of Northern Ireland where violence was
more prevalent, i.e. more severe and persistent.
We assess the robustness of our ￿ndings in a number of ways. We also
look for spillover e⁄ects across regions. Here, the results suggest that violence
in Belfast actually increased house prices in adjacent areas ￿consistent with
the data on relative changes in population over the period that we study.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section,
we give some background to the Northern Irish con￿ ict. Section three relates
our paper to the existing literature. In section four, we discuss data and
present some preliminary OLS results. Section ￿ve develops a model of house
prices and a statistical model of the peace process. We then explain how
this can be implemented empirically. Section 6 presents results, including a
number of robustness checks. Section seven concludes. Some details about
the data and the method are in the Appendix.
2 Background
From the 17th century onwards, the British consolidated their rule over Ire-
land. However, it was mainly in the nineteenth century that the struggle
for reform began. The status of Ireland proved to be a fractious issue in
U.K. politics over this century with the issue of Irish home rule splitting the
Liberal party at the end of the late nineteenth century. Northern Ireland
was created after the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 which granted the
rest of Ireland independence from the U.K.. From 1922 onwards, Northern
Ireland separated from the south, now the Republic of Ireland, and became a
self-governing province of the U.K.. However, the long-term status of North-
ern Ireland remained a contested issue. Within Northern Ireland, a mainly
3Protestant majority wished to remain part of the U.K. while a large mainly
Catholic minority campaigned for unity with the Republic. The Catholic mi-
nority in Northern Ireland were also, on the whole, less prosperous than the
Protestant majority even though for much of this period, Northern Ireland
had higher income per capita than the republic of Ireland. From 1922 to
1973, Northern Ireland was self-governed via its own Parliament (Stormont)
from 1922 to 1973.
The period often referred as the ￿The Troubles￿spans the period from
1969 until the mid 1990s and encompasses the main period of con￿ ict studied.
A series of events triggered a campaign of violence involving paramilitaries
from both sides ￿frequently referred to as Loyalists and Republicans, the
former wishing to remaining part of the U.K. and the latter seeking Irish
unity. The main paramilitary organisation on the Republican side was the
Irish Republican Army (IRA). From 1969, British troops were deployed on
the streets of NI and from 1973, the British government suspended home rule
and ran the province directly from Westminster. There were approximately
3500 deaths over this period of which around 1860 were ￿civilians￿ , around
390 were members of ￿republican￿paramilitary groups, and around 150 were
deaths of members of ￿loyalist￿paramilitary groups.
The Peace Process was initiated on December 15, 1993 when the Prime
Ministers of Ireland and the UK sign the ￿Downing Street Declaration￿ . This
a¢ rmed the right of the people of Northern Ireland to self-determination, and
that the province would be transferred to the Republic of Ireland from the
United Kingdom if and only if a majority of its population was in favour
of such a move. It also pledged the governments to seek a peaceful con-
stitutional settlement and promised that parties linked with paramilitaries
(such as Sinn FØin) could take part in the talks, so long as they abandoned
violence. In response to this, on August 31, 1994, the Irish Republican Army
declared a cease-￿re.
The next event of major signi￿cance was in 1998 when the Belfast Agree-
ment (normally referred to as the Good Friday Agreement) was signed. Its
key provisions include a¢ rmation of the principle that any change to the
constitutional status of Northern Ireland could only follow a majority vote
of its citizens, commitment by all parties to use "exclusively peaceful and
democratic means" and establishment of a Northern Ireland Assembly with
devolved legislative powers. On June 25,1998, elections to a new North-
ern Ireland Assembly took place. Following this, on August 15, 1998, the
Omagh bombing by a breakaway faction of the IRA killed 29 people leading
4to concerns about the stability of the peace process. Moreover, between Oc-
tober 14, 2002 ￿May 7, 2007, the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended
following allegations of spying.
The peace process took a further leap forward in July 28, 2005 when
the IRA made a public statement ordering an end to the armed campaign
and instructing its members to dump arms and to pursue purely political
means. Following this, on May 8, 2007, home rule was restored following
fresh elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly.
One key feature of the peace process is the degree of uncertainty about
how successful it was going to be. Between the landmark events that we
have noted, there was a huge amount of discussion concerning whether the
process would ultimately yield a peaceful outcome. One of the major uncer-
tainties surrounded the issue of decommissioning weapons and what process
of veri￿cation would be needed to create mutual trust.
To get a feel for how successful the peace process was in reducing killing,
we produce a graph (Figure 1) on aggregate killings in Northern Ireland over
our data period.1 The rapid fall in violence after the IRA cease ￿re in 1994q4
is clearly apparent as is the tick up after the Omagh bombing in 1998q3. By
and large, the e⁄ect of the peace process in the aggregate is clear.
3 Related Literature
This paper is related to a large existing literature that looks at how amenities
are capitalized into house prices. One important strand of this literature
surveyed by Boyle and Kiel (2001) looks at the impact of environmental
externalities on house prices. Their survey suggests rather mixed success in
being able to explain di⁄erences in house prices by measures of air quality,
water quality, land usage and pollutants.
There is also a long tradition of looking at the relationship between school
quality and house prices which is particularly relevant in the U.S. given the
extensive use of local property taxes to fund education. Kain and Quigley
(1975) is a classic reference in this ￿eld. More recently, Black (1999) is
an excellent example of how empirical studies of these issues can exploit
di⁄erences across jurisdictions over time. Using the fact that she can locate
people within a district who are close to boundaries, she ￿nds that a 5%
improvement in test scores leads to a 2.5% increase in house prices. Her study
1Details on this variable are provided in section four.
5deals persuasively with the possibility of reverse causation issues that often
plague such studies. Quigley and Rosenthal (2005) provides an overview
of the link between house prices and land-use planning. While there is
some support for the importance of such in￿ uences on house prices, they
point out some of the serious empirical issues that beset the literature and
interpretation of e⁄ects.
Our study relates to studies of the impact of crime on housing prices.
One recent example is the study of the impact of sex o⁄enders by Linden
and Rocko⁄ (2008). They use the exact location and moving in date of
sex o⁄enders to estimate their impact on housing prices in the immediate
proximity of the o⁄ender￿ s house. Their results suggest a price decrease of 4
percent of housing in a 0.1 mile radius around the sex o⁄ender￿ s home after
he/she moved in. Beyond the 0.1 mile radius, however, house prices seem
to be una⁄ected. Another recent example is Gibbons (2004) who uses a
cross-section of London property crime data to estimate the impact of these
crimes on housing prices. He ￿nds that an increase of one standard deviation
in property damage goes hand in hand with a 10 percent drop in property
prices.
There are a number of existing studies that look at the link between
violence and economic outcomes. In the ￿rst study of its kind, Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) use a synthetically constructed region which has
the same structural features as the Basque Country to identify the e⁄ect of
con￿ ict related deaths on the economy. After the outbreak of terrorism in
the late 1960￿ s, per capita GDP in the Basque Country declined about 10
percentage points relative to a synthetic control region without terrorism.
They also ￿nd that stocks of ￿rms with a signi￿cant part of their business
in the Basque Country showed a positive relative performance when truce
became credible, and a negative relative performance at the end of the cease-
￿re.
Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2008) study life satisfaction scores using
the Euro barometer and compare NI with the rest of the UK and the Republic
of Ireland ￿nding that that terrorist incidents are negatively correlated with
happiness. Willard, Guinnane and Rosen (1996) use an event study to
look at the impact of victories on the Union￿ s Greenback￿ s value in gold.
Zussman, Zussman and Orregaard Nielsen (2008) looks for a structural break
in stock price returns in Israel and the Palestinian territories around key
events a⁄ecting the Israeli-Palestinian con￿ ict. They ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect
of key events on asset prices. In an ingenious contribution Guidolin and La
6Ferrara (2007) look at the e⁄ect of war on the stock market value of ￿rms
using data from diamond mining ￿rms in Angola. They use an event study
methodology around the 2002 death of the rebel movement leader to identify
the e⁄ect of con￿ ict end. Collins and Margo (2007) studies the impact of riots
on property prices in a cross-section of 104 US cities in the 1960s and 70s.
They argue that if a riot causes a sustained decline in perceived amenities,
then this should show up in the relative decline of property values in the
a⁄ected city. In order to tackle the endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity
problems they instrument for riots with rainfall.
Even though the Northern Ireland con￿ ict is not always classi￿ed as a civil
war on standard de￿nitions, this paper is also a contribution to burgeoning
economics literature on the causes and consequences of con￿ ict ￿see Elbadawi
and Sambanis (2002) for a review. Most of that literature is focused on
the causes rather than the consequences of violent con￿ ict. However, one
important issue is how far the cessation of con￿ ict does lead to economic gains
which have a self-reinforcing impact on peace. To the extent that capital
losses on assets follow the onset of war, we should expect the mechanism that
we study here to have an impact on the sustainability of peace in the long
run. Given that housing is a major asset that is ￿xed in place, it is a good
place to start in exploring the possibility of a peace dividend.
We use Markov chain dynamics in this paper. This is also the strat-
egy employed by Blomberg and Hess (2002) which analyzes the connection
between economic well-being and con￿ icts. Like us, their analysis makes
extensive use of persistence estimates of con￿ ict, peace, recession and boom.
However, their data does not allow these states to be de￿ned endogenously
as we do here. We show here that the measurement of regional heterogeneity
is likely to be a⁄ected by the way con￿ ict is de￿ned.
4 Data and linear results
As mentioned above, the data come from quarterly observations on eleven
regions of Northern Ireland since October 1984. The housing price index
that we used comes from a survey of more than a thousand open market
housing transactions every quarter. Our data-set uses the average overall
housing price in a region and does not di⁄erentiate by housing type. It is
not surprising in the broader economic context of this period, which includes
a housing boom in the U.K. and the Republic of Ireland, that house prices
7have been increasing. Figure 2 shows this using the natural logarithm of
house prices in each of the eleven regions (the dashed line shows the average
across regions). Average nominal house price growth is 9% per year. All
eleven time series are characterized by a boom in house prices starting in the
second half of the 1990s, accelerating from 2000 onwards and again falling
after 2007. However, most of the variation in Figure 2 is not helpful in
identifying the peace dividend because growth runs parallel across all regions.
It can therefore not be disentangled whether it is caused by the end of the
con￿ ict or other common factors.2
We measure violence by the number of killings in a region ￿it is the
clearest and most objectively measurable indicator. We use the Con￿ ict
Archive on the Internet (CAIN) website which records the details of every
death arising from the present con￿ ict in Ireland from newspaper cuttings,
funerals, court records, cemeteries and books and pamphlets. The record
gives the date of death of every victim, the name, his or her age, their
￿ status￿in relation to the con￿ ict, which organization killed them, and a
brief description of the circumstances of their death. In addition, the data
set provides an almost exact address which allows for a matching to the house
price data. In this section we provide a brief discussion of the data (for details
see the appendix) and a ￿rst, naive estimate for the link between con￿ ict and
housing prices. The coded data includes all deaths in Northern Ireland that
are regarded con￿ ict-related by our source. The maps shown in Figure 3 give
a sense of how violence varied across time in the regions that we study. This
makes clear our point that there is a large measure of heterogeneity in the
incidence of violence across Northern Ireland. In particular, the maps show
that while violence dropped radically in some regions others are constantly
peaceful on the measure that we use. However, it is likely that these regions
will have been a⁄ected by other manifestations of the Troubles.
We begin our analysis by estimating the relationship between house prices
and killings using the following semi-log model:
ln(Hrt) = ￿r + ￿t + ￿yrt + "rt (1)
where ln(Hrt) is the natural log of our house price index for region r at date
t, yrt is the number of killings in region r at date t, ￿r are region dummies,
￿t are quarterly time dummies. We can interpret ￿ (which we expect to
2What our regression analysis will use in a sense is the deviation from the mean house-
price (dashed line) within the regions.
8be negative) as an average treatment e⁄ect of a ￿death￿ on house prices.
The key ￿identifying￿assumption is that there is no feedback from economic
factors onto the pattern of violence conditional on (￿r;￿t). We will also
include yrt￿1 rather than yrt.
An improvement in economic conditions following on from the peace
process could be the conduit for the e⁄ect of violence on house prices. To
some extent, we will be able to see whether or not this is the case by includ-
ing the unemployment rate, which fell sharply over this period, as a time
varying regressor. We will also include region speci￿c time trends for similar
reasons.
Some indicative results are in Table 1. Column (1) gives the raw cor-
relation between quarterly killings and house prices in the following quarter
excluding any region or time e⁄ects. This correlation is negative and sig-
ni￿cant. Column (2) includes region e⁄ects and the correlation remains
negative, although increases in size. Quarterly dummies are added in col-
umn (3). As expected from ￿gure 2, taking out macro-e⁄ects in this way
leads to a much smaller, although still negative and signi￿cant, correlation.
Column (4) shows that this correlation is robust to the introduction of region-
speci￿c time trends. Column (5) lags killings by half a year and the negative
correlation result holds up (becoming a little larger in size). The linear esti-
mate seems even robust to controlling for unemployment which takes on the
expected sign.
These linear OLS results are interesting but there are some conceptual
issues in interpreting them as a measure of the peace dividend. First, killings
are treated symmetrically no matter where they occur, but this is not entirely
satisfactory given that the amount of violence varies so much across regions.
We might expect an area like Belfast where killings are much more prevalent
to respond more to the peace process. We would therefore expect an het-
erogeneous and non-linear treatment e⁄ect. Second, the estimates con￿ ate
two things: the value to potential homeowners of reduced killing (the ￿true￿
peace dividend) and changes in expectations about how killings map into an
assessment of whether the peace process will be sustained. While we cannot
measure the latter directly, we can use a simple economic model to calibrate
this e⁄ect and then decompose our estimate into an expectations e⁄ect and
a dividend based on this estimate. To do this, we will need to develop a
statistical model of the peace process and the way that killings changed the
probability of sustained peace. We now develop such a model to see what
it predicts for the relationship between killings and house prices.
95 A Model of House Prices and Violence
In this section, we develop a theoretical model linking house prices and vio-
lence. We then introduce a stochastic process for the peace process. Finally,
we show how the parameters of this model can be estimated using methods
that have been developed to model business cycle dynamics.
5.1 A Model of House Prices
We assume a standard dividend-discount model of house prices where houses
are in￿nitely lived and potential home owners have rational expectations.
Assume also that the consumption value of the house (the dividend) in region
r at date t can be decomposed into a ￿standard￿part based on amenities
such as location and a part which depends on the level of violence. We write
this as:
urt = hr + ￿yrt
where hr is the standard consumption value of housing based on ￿xed loca-
tional factors, yrt is violence in period t and ￿￿ > 0 is the peace dividend
that represents how the absence of violence is being valued by residents. We
treat the component hr as ￿xed by region for simplicity of exposition. In
the empirical analysis we allow there to be a common time e⁄ect and/or a
region speci￿c time trend.
We interpret ￿, in line with the literature on amenities and house prices,
as representing the local public bad associated with killings in a neighbor-
hood. In our context, this is more plausible than thinking about the personal
risk of being a victim. In part, therefore, ￿ should pick up the general change
in the environment and defensive measures taken to protect citizens which
lowered the quality of life for residents during the Troubles.


























where  rt denotes the history of violence up to date r at time t, ￿r are the
parameters of the process generating violence in region r and ￿ denotes the
discount rate which is assumed to be common across time and regions.
The impact of current violence on house prices will now depend on how it
changes the second term in (2). If more killings lead potential home owners
10to update their view of future violence, then we expect a negative relationship
between (2) and violence in region r at date t. But this depends critically on
the properties of the assumed process for yrt which is a⁄ected by the peace
process ￿an unobserved state about which homeowners are learning.
5.2 The Peace Process
We model the peace process as an independent Markov chain. Let srt 2
f0;1g which determines whether region r is in peace or in con￿ ict at date
t where 0 denotes peace. This state is not observed directly ￿we can only
measure the amount of violence yrt. Both are linked through the following
switching model:
yrt = ￿r0 (1 ￿ srt) + ￿r1srt + "rt with "rt ￿ N(0;￿
2
rsrt):
Thus, ￿r0 is the mean number of killings in the peaceful state and ￿r1 is the
number of killings in con￿ ict. This allows for the possibility that ￿r0 > 0.
This is consistent with the standard approach taken in the literature on civil
wars where there is a threshold level of killings which needs to be passed
before a region or country is deemed to be in a state of civil war.
We allow the mean (and variance) of violence in each region to be a
function of this state. We posit four transition probabilities between peace
and con￿ ict denoted by:
p(srt = 1 j srt￿1 = 1) = pr
p(srt = 0 j srt￿1 = 1) = 1 ￿ pr
p(srt = 0 j srt￿1 = 0) = qr
p(srt = 1 j srt￿1 = 0) = 1 ￿ qr
The parameters ￿r in (2) are now the means and variances of violence in the
two states as well as the transition probabilities across these states.
The state in region r at date t, follows the process:
srt = 1 ￿ qr + ￿srt￿1 + vrt where ￿r = qr + pr ￿ 1
where vrt is an error term with a state-contingent distribution of
vrt j (srt￿1 = 1) =
￿
1 ￿ pr with probability pr
￿pr with probability 1 ￿ pr
11and
vrt j (srt￿1 = 0) =
￿
￿(1 ￿ qr) with probability qr
qr with probability 1 ￿ qr:
The forecast for the next period is dependent on the beliefs on the state srt
now which are based on the whole history  rt, available up to period t which
includes all past killings in the region. Formally
E (yrt+1 j  rt) = pr￿r1P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r) + (1 ￿ qr)￿r1P (srt = 0 j  rt;￿r)
+qr￿r0P (srt = 0 j  rt;￿r) + (1 ￿ pr)￿r0P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r)
with P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r) = 1 ￿ P (srt = 0 j  rt;￿r).
This allows us to use standard techniques to construct the projection of
past violence onto the expectation of future violence for which we have:
E (yrt+1 j  rt;￿r) = ￿r1 [￿r + ￿r (P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r) ￿ ￿r)]




This model gives us as a fairly straightforward expression for the second
















P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r) ￿ ￿r
1 ￿ ￿r￿
:
This has an intuitive interpretation. The ￿rst expression is the mean dis-
counted present of ￿permanent￿ violence which is most easily seen when
either peace is an absorbing state (￿r = 0) or con￿ ict is an absorbing state
(￿r = 1):
The second expression varies over time in response to how information
derived from the history of violence over the relevant time period is up-
dated. The term shows that the impact of P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r) on expected
violence is a⁄ected by the general persistence of the violence process, ￿r.
More speci￿cally, a ￿r close to one means that both peace and con￿ ict are
highly persistent and the probability of being in con￿ ict has a large impact
on the present value of violence. Provided that we can produce estimates
of the key underlying parameters and the probability of con￿ ict, we will be
able to construct an empirical counterpart for expression (3). We will call
this estimate d PDV rt and we will use it as a regressor to explain house prices
in line with equation (2).
125.3 Implementing the Model





. Once these parameters are known it is possible to
calculate the probability of con￿ ict P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r) by using the panel
data on violence yrt in a ￿lter provided by Hamilton (1989). Given the
central role of the probability of con￿ ict we discuss the ￿lter before turning
towards the estimation of ￿r.
A good starting point for the calculation of the probability of being in
con￿ ict, P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r), is Bayesian updating in period t. In period t,
the extrapolation of last period P
￿
st = 1 j  rt￿1;￿r
￿
is updated with killings
in t according to the standard formula:
P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r) =
f
￿














srt = j j  rt￿1;￿r
￿:
The immediate insight from this formula is that the probability can only be




















and therefore depend on parameters in ￿r.
The probability P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r) can be calculated if the past estimate
P
￿
srt￿1 = 1 j  rt￿1;￿r
￿
is known.3 This reliance of P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r) on
P
￿
srt￿1 = 1 j  rt￿1;￿r
￿
implies that previous probabilities of con￿ ict have to
be calculated ￿rst. The ￿lter therefore takes a starting value P (sr0 = 1 j  r0;￿r)
3To see that this dependency of P
￿






















st = 1;st￿1 = j j  t￿1;￿
￿
= P (st = 1 j st￿1 = j)P
￿
st￿1 = j j  t￿1;￿
￿
where P (st = 1 j st￿1 = j) is nothing else than the estimated p and 1 ￿ q contained in ￿.
Hence, one needs P
￿
st￿1 = 1 j  t￿1;￿
￿
to calculate P (st = 1 j  t;￿).
13and calculates
P (sr1 = 1 j  r1;￿r);P (sr2 = 1 j  r2;￿r):::P (srT = 1 j  rT;￿r)
by iteratively updating the probability of con￿ ict with the quarterly violence
data yrt. To some degree this is what a potential house-purchaser in region
r would have done, too.
However, this simple ￿lter relies on the availability of the vector ￿r.
The problem is that ￿r cannot be calculated without knowing the states
sr1;sr2:::srT which are unobserved. Hence, the estimation method needs to
determine when regime shifts occurred and at the same time estimate the
parameters of the model. One way of estimating the parameters of the vio-
lence process is the Expectation Maximization (EM) Algorithm described in
Hamilton (1990) which generates an estimate of ￿r by iteration.
In each iteration the algorithm makes use of the "smoothed" probability
of con￿ ict which is based on the entire violence data for a region4
P (srt = 1 j yrT;yrT￿1;:::;yr1;￿r):
These probabilities are then used to generate a distribution over the T 2 possi-
ble combinations of states sr1;sr2:::srT which is used to re-weight the violence
data yt. This weighted violence data can then be used to generate new es-
timates of the vector ￿t as if the underlying states were known. The next
iteration then starts by re-calculating the smoothed probabilities under the
new vector ￿r. The process is repeated until a ￿xed point for ￿r is found.
Hamilton (1990) shows that this ￿xed point is also the maximum likelihood
estimate.5
Table 2 presents the results of running the EM Algorithm for each of the
11 regions separately. The four columns show our estimates of ￿r1; ￿r0; pr
and qr. Quite clearly, Belfast is the most violent region with almost eight
killings per quarter in con￿ ict and over one in peacetime. Other regions
like Londonderry/Strabane or Mid/South Down are less violent on average
but also display long persistence in their con￿ ict (high values of pr). As
noted earlier, this persistence is an important feature of a con￿ ict because it
increase the leverage that present violence has on expectations.
4See Hamilton (1990) or Kim and Nelson (1998) for an explanation of smoothing and
the connection to the EM Algorithm.
5The implementation of this procedure was simpli￿ed signi￿cantly
by the provision of GAUSS programs by James Hamilton under
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jhamilto/software.ht.
14This point becomes clear when one compares, for example, the region
Londonderry/Strabane with East Antrim. East Antrim features similar es-
timates of ￿r1 and ￿r0 as Londonderry/Strabane but an estimate of pr close
to zero. That means that outbursts of violence will have relatively little
impact on expectations of future violence in East Antrim as con￿ ict is not
persistent.6
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the results of this methodology by comparing the
￿tted values of violence
^ yrt = ￿r0 + (￿r1 ￿ ￿r0)P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r)
with the raw violence data yrt in three di⁄erent regions. An immediate
observation is that only a relatively narrow band of movements in violence
triggers a change in P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r) and, hence, in the ￿tted value ^ yrt.
This is because the estimated likelihood of con￿ ict is mostly either close
to one or close to zero. Nonetheless, we regard this as a reasonable way
of weighting the data since a change between ten and twenty killings, for
example, carries less information about whether, say, Belfast is in con￿ ict
than a change from zero to ten killings.
Our estimation of the peace dividend uses the weighted series ^ yrt. The
weights are determined by the region-speci￿c transition probabilities pr and
qr. How important the weighting is can be seen by comparing the graphs
of the two violent regions with the graph for Lisburn. While Lisburn had
some violent incidents, violence rarely persisted for more than one quarter.
A look at table 2 con￿rms that our estimate of pr is 0.288 for Lisburn which
is low compared to the numbers of over 0.9 in both Belfast and London-
derry/Strabane. Thus, we would expect a change from peace to con￿ ict to
have very di⁄erent implications for expectations and, hence, house prices in
the three regions. If we were to use ^ yrt directly this fact would be ignored.
6 Results
This section presents the core results as well as a number of variants and
robustness checks.
6The fact that ￿r < 0 in this case does not a⁄ect the result. In fact, our regression
results would remain unchanged if the three violence time series for which this is the case
were replaced with zeros.
156.1 Core Results
The core results are in Table 3. They come from running regressions of the
form:
ln(Hrt) = ￿r + ￿t + ￿ d PDV rt￿1 + "rt (4)
where, as above, ￿r are region dummies, ￿t are quarterly time dummies. The
variable d PDV rt is our computed measure of the expected discounted number
of future killings from (2) as computed in the previous section. Given that
d PDV rt is highly non-linear, we bootstrap the standard errors. We will assess
the robustness of the approach to timing and the assumed discount factor.
As our baseline case we choose a 5% discount rate.
Column (1) of Table 3 shows that there is a signi￿cant negative correla-
tion between our (lagged) measure of the discounted value of violence and
house prices. Below, we will discuss the size of this e⁄ect in economic terms.
Column (2) shows that this correlation remains when the present value is
calculated with a discount rate of 1%. Although the size of the coe¢ cient
changes quite dramatically, it turns that it is similar in magnitude from an
economic point of view. In column (3), we test robustness of our core result
to lagging our present discounted value measure by half a year. The result
is robust. Column (4) introduces the unemployment rate as an additional
regressor. The coe¢ cient on the present discounted value measure of killings
is identical. Finally, column (5) introduces region speci￿c time trends. Al-
though the size of the coe¢ cient is a little smaller the core correlation that
we would expect if there is a genuine peace dividend is present in the data.
Taken together these results provide convincing evidence of a Northern
Ireland peace dividend. We now assess the robustness of this ￿nding.
6.2 Heterogeneity
The measure that we are using to estimate the impact of killing on house
prices is naturally heterogenous with respect to the region and timing of
killings. However, it is still interesting to see whether there is any further
heterogeneity by interacting this variable with other characteristics of each
region which arguably could have a bearing on the likelihood and impact of
con￿ ict.
We choose three such measures: (i) the population size, (ii) the level of
pre-sample violence in each region and (iii) measures of Protestant-Catholic
16polarization. In each case, we interact the variable d PDV rt in equation (4)
with the variable in question. The results are presented in Table 4.
In column (1), we use present value per capita as a regressor. The core
result is robust to this. It is re-assuring that our results are not driven by
higher population numbers in more violent areas. Column (2) contrasts the
per capita measure with the original present value measure. It turns out
that the per capita measure is much weaker than the present values itself.
This lends some support to the view that killings are a regional public bad.
Individuals care about the level of violence in the region when they buy a
house not their own probability of being killed.
Column (3) has the interaction with pre-sample violence, column (4) with
the share of Catholics and column (5) with our measure of religious polar-
ization constructed from this share.7 Looking across the table, it is clear
that none of these interactions is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero suggesting
that our heterogeneous measure in d PDV rt is already doing a decent job at
picking up the way that a given death has an impact on house prices.8
6.3 Alternative Speci￿cations
The Probability of Con￿ ict as a Regressor We have supposed that it is
killing which re￿ ects the amenity cost of living in a neighborhood. However,
another interpretation of the results is that it is the probability of unobserved
latent state ￿peace or con￿ ict ￿that really matters. After all, there are
many aspects of violence beyond killings that made life during the Troubles
unpleasant and these are likely correlated with killings.
Suppose instead, therefore, that house prices are not a⁄ected by killings
but by the underlying state st. Hence the utility ￿ ow from a house is now:
urt = hr + ￿
0srt: (5)
Here, the amenity is peace itself. This slightly modi￿ed utility function gives
7See the appendix for more details on the polarization measure.
8In the Appendix we show results form re-estimating the semi-log model with interac-
tion terms. Interactions with pre-sample violence and the share of Catholics living in a
region are signi￿cant. However, in view of the results from Table 4, it is clear that these
interaction terms are really only proxying for underlying di⁄erences across regions which
our economic model is capturing.







iP (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r)
￿￿
=
1 ￿ qr + hr
1 ￿ ￿
+
P (srt = 1 j  rt;￿r)
1 ￿ ￿r￿
: (6)
Our basic method can be adapted to assess the robustness of our ￿ndings to
this alternative view.
In column (1) of Table 5. we include the estimated value of
P(srt=1j rt;￿r)
1￿￿r￿
in place of d PDV rt. A similar qualitative story emerges. In particular,
the result seems very robust to controlling for unemployment and regions
speci￿c time trends (column (2)). The magnitude of the e⁄ect, however, is
relatively low. This is perhaps not too surprising given that d PDV rt is really
an interaction term between the probability and the region-speci￿c di⁄erence
(￿r1 ￿ ￿r0). Hence, if we focus on the con￿ ict probability we are neglecting
the regional heterogeneity in terms of severity of violence, i.e. the intensity
of violence e⁄ect.
Neighborhood Spillovers Our core results assume that the impact of
violence is con￿ned to the geographic area for which we measure house prices.
However, it may be that home owners care about the level of violence in other
regions when choosing where to live. This could either be because of a direct
spillover or because home owners are choosing ex ante where to live creating
general equilibrium price changes.
To consider this possibility, we look for spillover e⁄ects from the most
violent regions: Belfast, Craigavon/Armagh, Londonderry/Strabane, Mid
Ulster and Mid/South Down onto house prices in adjacent regions. Thus,
we create a dummy variable denoting whether a region has a boundary with
one of these regions and interact that with the d PDV rt in the adjacent region.
These interaction terms are shown in column (3) and give us an interesting
￿nding. First, we ￿nd a core ￿own correlation￿which is negative and signif-
icant and of similar magnitude to the core results. Among the interaction
terms all results bar Belfast are suggestive of a negative spillover of violence
across regions. However, only one of these coe¢ cients is signi￿cant.9 The
correlation of house prices in adjacent neighborhoods with Belfast is positive.
This is consistent with a ￿ ight away from living in Belfast to adjacent neigh-
borhoods in response to the violence. Although we do not have evidence on
9The Mid/South Down region had a relatively high share of killings of British Army
soldiers - it is not unreasonable that the e⁄ect of these killings is less local.
18migration directly, this explanation is consistent with broad changes in pop-
ulation captured by population statistics provided by the Northern Ireland
Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). According to their data, popula-
tion in Belfast declined from 316,358 inhabitants in 1981 to 267,374 in 2006.10
The view that this re￿ ects at least partly local migration is supported by the
fact that population increased in all other twenty-four local government dis-
tricts throughout the same period.
A Single Index Model Our independent Markov chain model is ￿ exible
in that it allows each region of Belfast to be in a state of peace of con￿ ict
independently. Hence, home owners are deemed to make a local assessment
of the peace process and what it means for them in the locality. However,
another plausible view is that the core assessment on peace is a macro-e⁄ect
e⁄ect based on all violence in Northern Ireland.11 On this view, we should
model the probability of peace as a single index.
We implement this idea as follows. First, we add all the regional quarterly
killings to create an aggregate Northern Irish time series of killings. This
time series is then fed into the EM Algorithm to produce an estimate of
the probability of con￿ ict for Northern Ireland as a whole which is now
P(st = 1 j  t;￿t). Figure 7 shows the EM estimate of total violence ^ yt
together with the total Northern Irish violence from ￿gure 1. As can be seen
in the graph, the estimated probability of con￿ ict, and with it the violence
estimate, declines in the ￿rst quarter of 1995 but shoots back up around the
time of the Omagh bombing.
In a second step, we test the extent to which this probability of violence
for Northern Ireland as a whole can explain regional violence variation. We
do this simply by running eleven OLS regressions:
yrt = ￿r + ￿rP(st = 1 j  t;￿t) + "rt: (7)
This creates an estimate of the average level of violence (￿r) and the im-
pact of the Northern Irish con￿ ict (￿r) for each region. Depending on the
magnitudes of regional violence and the correlation with P(st = 1 j  t;￿t),
this gives an new estimate of the mean levels of violence during peace and
10NISRA population data is available online under http://www.nisra.gov.uk/. The pop-
ulation statistics give population densities and area.
11We are grateful to Daron Acemoglu for persuading us to look at this alternative
interpretation.
19con￿ ict. (The estimated region-speci￿c intercept is the average death-count
in peacetime while the estimated constant plus slope coe¢ cient are the av-
erage death-count in con￿ ict.) Note, however, that not all coe¢ cients that
we estimate this way are statistically signi￿cant.12 Most peaceful regions,
for example, have no signi￿cant slope coe¢ cient implying no impact of the
estimated Northern Irish con￿ ict on their regional violence levels. i.e. the
series P(st = 1 j  t;￿t) is simply not correlated with the yrt for such regions.
As a ￿nal step we use the signi￿cant slopes and constants in each region to
generate a panel of ￿tted killings. Figure 8 gives an idea of how these single
index ￿tted values compare to the region-speci￿c ￿tted values. The graph
shows the the violence times series for Londonderry/Strabane plus both ￿tted
values. As can be seen in the graph the single index time series translates the
Northern Irish con￿ ict into ￿tted values that do not correspond to violence
movements in Londonderry/Strabane - in particular after 1995.
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 5 report the regression results when the
single index ￿tted violence levels are introduced into our standard empirical
model. Note that in this speci￿cation there is no di⁄erence between the
present value and ￿tted killings because the persistence parameters p and q
are now identical across regions. The core results of a negative correlation
between house prices and this region speci￿c measure of violence (based on a
single index of a latent state) remains including when we add unemployment
and region speci￿c time trends as a regressor (column (5)).
Summary These additional results presented in Table 5 bear out the core
￿nding of the paper that violence and house price prices are negatively cor-
related across the regions of Northern Ireland. Perhaps the main ￿nding
of substantive economic interest in this section is the evidence in favor of
spillovers across regions.
6.4 Economic Signi￿cance
We now turn to the size of e⁄ect that is predicted by our empirical models.
For this, we take the result in column (1) in Table 3 and use it to compute the
95% con￿dence interval of the percentage change in house prices associated
with a unit change in present value. The boundaries of this interval are then
12We use levels of signi￿cance at ten percent. Alternative exclusion criterion would lead
to similiar results.
20multiplied by the region-speci￿c estimates of the present value of killings in
con￿ ict minus those in peace. The results are in Table 6 which also gives the
present value estimates for completeness. In order to show the robustness
of the quantitative results table 6 shows computations for the discount rates
of 5% and 1%.
A ￿rst observation is that the choice of discount rate is immaterial in
economic terms. In looking at the estimates, we ￿nd that overall our model
predicts that peace leads to an increase in house prices of between 1.7% and
3.1% all else equal. However, these e⁄ects are highly heterogeneous across
regions. For Belfast where violence was greatest, the estimate for a change
in house prices is between 8% and 14.5% using a 5% discount rate.
Another way to look at the economic signi￿cance of con￿ ict is to compare
its impact to that of unemployment. Column (4) of Table 3 gives us a rough
idea about how unemployment might shape housing prices. The coe¢ cient
on the log of unemployment in column (4) indicates that the impact of a
one standard deviation change (￿unemp = 0:7303) is around 10.5%, which is
below the upper bound estimated for the impact of violence in Belfast and
but considerably above the impact of violence in other regions.
It is interesting to compare these results with what would emerge from the
average coe¢ cient on killings which we estimate from the OLS. This is given
in Table 7. We make this e⁄ect heterogeneous by applying our estimates
of the mean di⁄erence in violence from the Markov switching model. This
model predicts a smaller e⁄ect of violence on house prices compared to the
model based on a d PDV rt calculation. The 95% con￿dence interval ranges
from 0.8% to 1.9%. But more striking is the way that the models handle
heterogeneity in the impact of violence. For Belfast, the estimate is from
2.2% to 5.5% with the upper bound lying below the lower bound of the model
based on d PDV rt. In general all the estimates of the OLS model in more
violent regions are lower than their counterparts based on the non-linear
model of violence.
It is important to stress in this context that the derived heterogeneity
and magnitude are not a result of our basic methodology of estimating a
di⁄erent con￿ ict process for each region. As can be seen in table 8, estimates
of the above-mentioned single index model yields very similar results in both
respects. This robustness is encouraging suggesting that choosing between
this model of an aggregate peace process and the region-by-region model is
of no great signi￿cance to the economic ￿ndings of the paper.
217 Concluding Comments
This paper has looked at the e⁄ect of violence in Northern Ireland on house
prices. The peace process of this region provides an interesting context in
which to look at the peace dividend as measured by home owners willingness
to pay for houses. The novelty of our study lies partly in the data ￿we have
both spatial (within-region) and quarterly temporal variation in violence to
exploit in measuring how much changes in violence has a⁄ected house prices.
Our approach also compares ￿ndings from a standard OLS estimate with one
derived from an empirical model which is more grounded in economic theory
and a model of the underlying peace process.
Both approaches suggest that there is a negative relationship between
house prices and killings in line with what we would expect. However, the
economically motivated model yields rather di⁄erent conclusions on the size
of the peace dividend and its distribution across regions. This makes sense
since we would expect the process that generates a mapping between house
prices and violence to be non-linear when potential home owners are weighing
up the pros and cons of purchasing a house. Also interesting is the evidence
on spillover across areas suggesting that some kind of general equilibrium
response to violence including migration across regions may be at work.
What we have estimated here is the non-macro component of the peace
dividend. To the extent that there are common components that have lifted
all regions of Northern Ireland, they are absorbed in the quarterly dummy
variables. However, given other macro-e⁄ects including the rapid growth
rate of the Republic of Ireland over this period, it is close to impossible to
reliably estimate this e⁄ect. But it is perfectly possible that these e⁄ects
are larger than those that we have estimated here.
Sustaining peace is always a challenge in places were there are long-lived
political and social tensions. Part of sustaining peace is to convince those
involved in supporting violence that there are manifest bene￿ts to peace.
This study shows that home owners￿willingness to pay to live in regions
were violence decreased in Northern Ireland created a tangible stake in the
maintenance of peace.
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248 Data Appendix
Table 9 gives the summary statistics of the used and generated data. This
sections will describe each of the variables in detail.
Killings: This variable relies on data from the Con￿ ict Archive on the
Internet (CAIN) website which presents updated work by Sutton (1994) who
recorded the details of every killing arising from the present con￿ ict in Ireland
from newspaper cuttings, funerals, court records, cemetries and books and
pamphlets. The book gives the date of the killing of every victim, the name,
his or her age, their ￿ status￿in relation to the con￿ ict, which organization
killed them, and a brief description of the circumstances of their death. In
addition, the data set provides an almost exact address which allows us to
match this to the house price data. For example:
Example
25 January David Dornan (26) Protestant Killed by:
1989 Status: Civilian (Civ) Ulster Freedom Fighters
Shot at his workplace, building site, Kingsmore Link Road,
Lisburn, County Antrim. Assumed to have been a Catholic.
Housing Price: We use the house price index provided by the Uni-
versity of Ulster in cooperation with the Bank of Ireland and the Northern
Ireland Housing Price Executive. The project surveys more than a thou-
sand open market housing transactions every quarter. Data is provided for
eleven regions starting from October 1984 until today (with the exception of
a few quarters for which no reports could be found in the UK or Ireland).
Our data-set uses the average overall housing price in a region and does not
di⁄erentiate by housing type.
Population: The population and religion mix comes from the 1991 Cen-
sus, Census O¢ ce for Northern Ireland. The data is by district council so
that it has to be recoded to ￿t to house price regions. The ￿t is reasonable
except for the district council Strabane which is split into two parts by two
Housing Price Regions. As a simpli￿cation we treat the population (and un-
employed) of Strabane as belonging half to the region Londonderry/Strabane
and half to Enniskillen/Fermanagh/South Tyrone.
25Region Coding






























We have also used population trends between 1991 and 2001 (the two
census years) but results have been identical and are therefore not reported.
Unemployment: Monthly unemployment counts are provided by the
UK o¢ ce for National Statistics. We use the 3 month average of the counts
for our purposes. Again, unemployment counts are provided for each of the
council districts so that we have to recode the data according to the above
26table. We have also combined this data with constructed population trends
to see whether a measure of the unemployment rate would yield di⁄erent
results. This is not the case.
Polarization: We use the 1991 census data to construct the share of
Catholics in the total population. Our polarization measure is constructed
with the help of this share and the following formula
polarization = share(1 ￿ share):
Hence, polarization is high if the group of Catholics and non-Catholics
are the same size and low if one group is in the clear majority.13 Di⁄erent
measures of polarization that use the full available data on the four largest
religious groups in Northern Ireland have been tested and lead to identical
results.
Pre-sample deaths: Pre-sample deaths for the years 1981 and 1982
have been compiled by the same rules as the deaths data. Once the data
was compiled we calculated the average quarterly amount of deaths for each
region.
13See Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for a more detailed discussion of polarization
measures.
27Appendix: Heterogeneity in Raw Violence Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice)
deaths -0.0180*** -0.00589 -0.0586 -0.0321***
(0.00545) (0.00485) (0.0401) (0.00932)
deaths per capita -1598*** 889.4
(480.1) (892.5)
deaths                          
* pre-sample violence -0.00147*
(0.000761)
deaths                          
* polarization 0.197
(0.175)
deaths                         
* share of catholics 0.0417**
(0.0197)
Observations 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
Region Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987
Number of regions 11 11 11 11 11
Standard OLS errors in parentheses (Note: not bootstrapped)
Deaths are weighed with their standard deviation.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 1: Linear Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
COEFFICIENT ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice)
deaths -0.189*** -0.209*** -0.0134*** -0.00767*** -0.0108***
(0.0199) (0.0210) (0.00291) (0.00296) (0.00307)




Observations 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038 921
Region Fixed Effects no yes yes yes yes yes
Time Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes
Region-Specific Time Trends no no no yes no no
R-squared 0.001 0.088 0.987 0.989 0.987 0.986
Note: All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Deaths are normed by the overall standard deviation of deaths.
Time Periods: 1984q4 - 2007q4 (1-5), 1987q3 - 2007q4 (6)
OLS standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 2: Estimation of Region-Specific Markov Chain Parameters
Region
Mean Deaths per 
Quarter in Conflict
Mean Deaths per 
Quarter in Peace
Probability of a 
Quarter of Conflict 
following Conflict
Probability of a 
Quarter of Peace 
following Peace
Belfast 8.114 1.334 0.935 0.956
North Down 1.114 0.000 0.268 0.877
Lisburn 1.333 0.000 0.288 0.799
East Antrim 1.431 0.000 0.074 0.851
Londonderry/Strabane 1.811 0.111 0.962 0.965
Antrim/Ballymena 0.986 0.000 0.000 0.894
Coleraine/Limavady N Coast 1.648 0.000 0.000 0.926
Enniskillen/Fermanagh/ S Tyrone 1.686 0.000 0.765 0.880
Mid Ulster 3.661 0.000 0.746 0.857
Mid and South Down 2.388 0.093 0.967 0.969
Craigavon/Armagh 3.273 0.266 0.643 0.844
Estimates obtained through application of the EM Algorithm discussed in Hamilton (1990)Table 3: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
COEFFICIENT ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice)
present value of killings          
(r = 5%), see equation 2
-0.0607*** -0.0579*** -0.0410***
(0.00895) (0.00946) (0.0113)
present value of killings           
(r = 1%), see equation 2
-0.210***
(0.0303)
present value of killings         





Observations 1038 1038 1038 921 1038
Region Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Region-Specific Time Trend no no no no yes
R-squared 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.989
Note: All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Present values are normed by their standard deviation.
Time Periods: 1984q4 - 2007q4 (1-3, 5), 1987q3 - 2007q4 (4)
Bootstrapped standard errors (1000 iterations) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 4: Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
COEFFICIENT ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice)




present value of killings (r = 5%), 
see equation 2
-0.0594*** -0.0750*** -0.0510** -0.170
(0.0183) (0.0199) (0.0234) (0.338)
present value of killings (r = 5%)        
*  mean of pre-sample violence
0.0176
(0.0222)
present value of killings (r = 5%)        
*  share of catholics
-0.00938
(0.0202)




Observations 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
Region Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Region-Specific Time Trend no no no no no
R-squared 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987
Notes: Explanatory variables are normed by their respective overall standard deviation and lagged by one quarter.
Time Periods: 1984q4 - 2008q4
Bootstrapped standard errors (1000 iterations) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 5: Alternative Non-Linear Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
COEFFICIENT ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice) ln(houseprice)
conflict (present value at r = 5%) -0.00804*** -0.00953***
(0.00136) (0.00182)
present value of killings               
(r = 5%), see equation 2
-0.0673***
(0.0115)
boundary to Belfast                     
* present value (Belfast)
0.0269***
(0.00728)
















deaths                                         





Observations 1038 921 1038 1038 921
Region Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Region-Specific Time Trend no yes no no no
R-squared 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.987 0.986
Bootstrapped standard errors (1000 iterations) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: All violence variables are normed by their respective overall standard deviation.
Time Periods: 1984q4 - 2008q4 (1, 3, 4), 1987q3 - 2008q4 (2, 5)Table 6: Economic Significance
lower bound upper bound lower bound upper bound
Belfast 4.67 2.82 8.02 14.54 4.01 3.50 7.74 13.84
North Down 0.19 0.13 0.23 0.42 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.32
Lisburn 0.30 0.24 0.26 0.47 0.28 0.27 0.20 0.35
East Antrim 0.22 0.17 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.33
Londonderry/Strabane 1.13 0.53 2.61 4.73 0.95 0.76 2.84 5.08
Antrim/Ballymena 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.29 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.22
Coleraine/Limavady N Coast 0.16 0.09 0.28 0.50 0.12 0.10 0.21 0.38
Enniskillen/Fermanagh/ S Tyrone 0.62 0.44 0.78 1.42 0.55 0.51 0.64 1.14
Mid Ulster 1.38 1.04 1.47 2.67 1.25 1.17 1.25 2.23
Mid and South Down 1.51 0.63 3.79 6.86 1.24 0.96 4.27 7.65
Craigavon/Armagh 1.20 0.97 1.00 1.82 1.14 1.09 0.73 1.31
Average 1.05 0.65 1.71 3.10 0.91 0.80 1.67 2.98
Average (population weights) 1.58 0.97 2.63 4.77 1.36 1.19 2.56 4.58
Note: Present values are normed by their overall standard deviation. Population weights are by 1991 population (see appendix for details).
Present Value of 
Violence (r = 1%) 
during Peace Time
Impact of Conflict on Houseprices in 
Percent (95% Confidence Intervall)
Present Value of 
Violence (r = 5%) in 
Conflict
Present Value of 
Violence (r = 5%) 
during Peace Time
Impact of Conflict on Houseprices in 
Percent (95% Confidence Intervall)
Present Value of 
Violence (r = 1%) in 
ConflictTable 7: Comparison of Estimates
lower bound upper bound lower bound upper bound
Belfast 8.02 14.54 8.114 1.334 2.22 5.50
North Down 0.23 0.42 1.114 0.000 0.36 0.90
Lisburn 0.26 0.47 1.333 0.000 0.44 1.08
East Antrim 0.24 0.43 1.431 0.000 0.47 1.16
Londonderry/Straban 2.61 4.73 1.811 0.111 0.56 1.38
Antrim/Ballymena 0.16 0.29 0.986 0.000 0.32 0.80
Coleraine/Limavady  0.28 0.50 1.648 0.000 0.54 1.34
Enniskillen/Fermanag 0.78 1.42 1.686 0.000 0.55 1.37
Mid Ulster 1.47 2.67 3.661 0.000 1.20 2.97
Mid and South Down 3.79 6.86 2.388 0.093 0.75 1.86
Craigavon/Armagh 1.00 1.82 3.273 0.266 0.98 2.44
Average 1.71 3.10 2.49 0.16 0.76 1.89
Note: Present values are normed by their overall standard deviation
Present Value Estimates Raw Violence Data Estimates
Impact of Conflict on Houseprices in 
Percent (95% Confidence Intervall) Estimated Mean 
Level of Violence in 
Conflict
Estimated Mean 
Level of Violence 
during Peace Time
Impact of Conflict on Houseprices in 
Percent (95% Confidence Intervall)Table 8: Economic Significance - Single Index Model
lower bound upper bound
Belfast 7.00 1.02 7.66 14.10
North Down 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.00
Lisburn 0.50 0.00 0.65 1.19
East Antrim 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Londonderry/Strabane 1.65 0.00 2.11 3.89
Antrim/Ballymena 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00
Coleraine/Limavady N Coast 0.21 0.00 0.27 0.50
Enniskillen/Fermanagh/ S Tyrone 1.20 0.00 1.54 2.83
Mid Ulster 2.76 0.00 3.54 6.51
Mid and South Down 2.22 0.00 2.84 5.24
Craigavon/Armagh 1.89 0.00 2.42 4.46
Average 1.61 0.12 1.91 3.52
Average (population weights) 2.41 0.23 2.80 5.15
Mean of Deaths in 
Conflict        (Single 
Index)
Mean of Deaths 
during Peace Time  
(Single Index)
Impact of Conflict on Houseprices in 
Percent (95% Confidence Intervall)Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
houseprice 77932.2 58232.4 23222 292931
unemployment count 6009.417 5353.389 1000.333 34696.67
number of deaths 0.9082251 2.353189 0 29
population 143439.6 67169.43 72033 340036
polarization 0.2012915 0.0496568 0.090681 0.2476119
pre-sample deaths mean 1.829545 2.572467 0 8.114
present value (r = 5%) 
see equation 2
19.28806 23.97179 1.898856 112.0985
present value (r = 1%) 
see equation 2
91.93297 109.5117 9.361521 440.3561
Table 9: Summary Statistics
data
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Figure 21
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Fitted Values (Single Index Model)